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STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950769-CA 
v. : 
LARRY BRUCE DIETZ, : Priority No. 2 
aka THOMAS LEONARD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Larry Dietz appeals the trial court's refusal to 
reduce his conviction for a second degree felony theft (R. 16) . 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-405 (1995) and 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly refuse to lower the degree of 
defendant's conviction based on his plea to second degree felony 
theft where he based his motion on an unestablished fact, and 
where the original conviction gave defendant that for which he 
bargained? Because this issue involves the interpretation of 
case law, it presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-4 05 
(1995) (theft statute), 76-6-412 (1995) (old theft 
classifications), 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995)(amended theft 
classifications), 76-6-501 (1995) (old forgery statute), and 76-6-
501 (Supp. 1995)(amended forgery statute). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with three counts of second 
degree felony forgery pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1995) (R. 1, 22-23, 30). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to 
one count of second degree felony theft by deception in exchange 
for the State's dismissal of the three forgery counts and 
agreement not to prosecute him for any additional similar 1994 
thefts discovered in Box Elder county; defendant pleaded guilty 
to second degree felony theft on May 15, 1995 (R. 2-3, 12, 16, 
30) . 
By order dated May 15, 1995, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory prison term for second degree felony 
theft (one-to-fifteen-years), imposed a $2,500.00 fine, and 
ordered defendant to pay restitution (R. 17). Defendant later 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea (R. 20-23). At the motion 
hearing, defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty 
2 
claiming that the facts supported only a class A misdemeanor 
theft conviction (R. 61, 80-82, 89-90). The trial court denied 
his motion for reduction on October 31, 1995 (R. 61-65). 
Defendant filed his notice of appeal November 13, 1995 (R. 68).a 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant engaged in a scheme where he would purchase money 
orders, alter the face amount, use the altered money orders to 
purchase inexpensive items, then keep the difference (R. 31, 35). 
The three money orders the State recovered had an original face 
value of $3-00 that defendant had altered to read $100.00 (R. 
31) . 
The State charged defendant with three counts of second 
degree felony forgery for the three money orders it had recovered 
(R. 30). The parties ultimately entered into a plea agreement 
with the following terms: 1) defendant would plead guilty to a 
single count of second degree felony theft by deception; 2) the 
defendant's notice of appeal states he seeks to appeal his 
sentencing, but identifies the date the trial court orally ruled 
on his motion to reduce his conviction (R. 68). Therefore, 
defendant presumably appeals only the denial of his motion to 
resentence; any challenge to the original sentencing must fail 
because defendant did not timely file his notice of appeal. Utah 
R. App. P. 4(a); State v. Montoya. 825 P,2d 676, 678 (Utah App. 
1991). 
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State would dismiss the three forgery counts; and 3) the State 
would not prosecute defendant for any further money orders passed 
in Box Elder County during 1994 (R. 30-31).2 
Effective May 1, 1995, the legislature amended both the 
forgery statute and the theft classification statutes. The 
legislature made all forgeries a third degree felony. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-501 (Supp. 1995). The legislature amended the 
classifications for theft, requiring proof of property valued at 
$5,000.00 or more to support a second degree felony and of 
$1,000.00 to $5,000.00 to support a third degree felony. 
Defendant entered his plea at the May 15, 1995 arraignment 
(R. 16). At that time, the State acknowledged that it knew of 
only three money orders (R. 35). The State also stated, however, 
that it suspected more and that defendant had privately admitted 
to more (id,).3 The State concluded, *[Defendant] was charged 
earlier with multiple second degree felonies, but because of 
2Defendant also agreed to pay restitution on all discovered 
money orders (R. 30). 
defendant stated he had passed six altered money orders in 
Tremonton, but did not state the amount to which he altered them 
or whether he contended those represented all of the altered 
money orders (R. 31). Defendant's counsel later represented that 
defendant passed a total of six in Box Elder County (R. 40) ; 
however, defendant passed at least one in Brigham City that he 
did not acknowledge (R. 5, 77) . 
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recent legislative changes, it is appropriate to lump them all 
together and make a single second degree" (id.). Defendant 
agreed that the State accurately represented what had happened 
(is2L). 
Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea, 
contending that his trial counsel did not know about the forgery 
reclassification to a third degree felony and therefore did not 
properly advise him (R. 22-23) . At the motion hearing, trial 
counsel stated that he would not have advised his client to plead 
to second degree felony theft rather than to three counts of 
third degree felony forgery and the court should vacate the plea 
(R. 73-75). Defendant then contended that the facts introduced 
at the plea hearing established, at most, theft of $700.00: only 
enough for a class A misdemeanor under the theft 
reclassificat ions (R. 80, 82, 84-85, 89-90)• Based on that 
claim, defendant withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
and asked the trial court to resentence him to a class A 
misdemeanor fid.). 
During that hearing, the State conceded that it did not have 
enough information to get to the $5,000.00 property value 
necessary to support second degree felony theft under the 
reclassifications (R. 78). 
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The trial court denied defendant's motion to resentence him 
to a class A misdemeanor because defendant wwas an informed and 
educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to confer with 
counsel, and made a comprehensive settlement of all pending and 
potential charges against him by entering a guilty plea to a 
single second degree Felony" (R. 64). The trial court's order is 
attached as addendum B. 
The argument section contains additional relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion. 
Defendant based his motion for resentencing on his claim that, at 
most, he had stolen $700.00. However, the record does not 
support his reliance on that figure. Defendant admitted to 
passing six money orders in Tremonton, but never testified about 
their amount. The State never conceded that defendant had 
accurately represented the full number of money orders he had 
passed. The plea bargain did not specify the number of money 
orders defendant passed in 1994; to the contrary, it covered all 
money orders passed during 1994. More importantly, defendant's 
plea necessarily contained an admission that he had stolen 
property worth at least enough to support that plea, and 
defendant never contested that admission when he pleaded to 
€ 
second degree felony theft. 
Moreover, defendant mistakenly contends that the trial court 
could not legally impose a second degree felony punishment 
because he did not actually commit a second degree felony theft. 
In exchange for a plea to a single second degree felony for all 
money orders passed during 1994, the State waived its right to 
prosecute defendant for any money orders passed during that year. 
Because defendant traded a single one-to-fifteen year prison 
sentence to eliminate the risk of convictions for an unlimited 
number of altered money orders passed during 1994, he got what he 
bargained for. Therefore, he had no right to have his conviction 
lowered to a class A misdemeanor. 
Either of the above independently supports the trial court's 
decision. Alternatively, defendant is, at most, entitled to a 
reduction to a third degree felony. Even if this Court concludes 
that the parties believed defendant was pleading guilty under the 
old theft classifications, which required proof of property worth 
$1,000.00 or more to support a second degree felony, defendant's 
plea to that crime necessarily admitted that property value, and 
defendant did not contend otherwise at the time he pleaded. Even 
under the new classifications, that admission supports a third 
degree felony. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO REDUCE DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTION BECAUSE HE BASES HIS CLAIM THAT HE COMMITTED 
ONLY A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR ON AN UNESTABLISHED FACT, 
AND BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION AND SENTENCE GAVE HIM WHAT 
HE BARGAINED FOR; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS AT MOST 
ENTITLED TO A REDUCTION TO A THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
Defendant denominated his motion one for resentencing. 
However, in support of that motion, defendant contended that the 
facts supported, at most, a class A misdemeanor. Therefore, 
regardless of how defendant characterized his motion, he 
requested that the trial court reduce the degree of his 
conviction from a second degree felony to a class A misdemeanor. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion because he "was an 
informed and educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to 
confer with counsel, and made a comprehensive settlement of all 
pending and potential charges against him by entering a guilty 
plea to a single second degree Felony" (R. 64). The trial court 
distinguished the sole case on which defendant relied, State v. 
Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974), because Saxton involved a jury 
conviction for a specifically charged crime. Defendant, by 
contrast, negotiated a comprehensive settlement of all pending 
and potential charges for 1994 (R. 63). For the reasons argued 
below, the trial court correctly refused to reduce defendant's 
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conviction to a class A misdemeanor. 
A. Defendant relies on a fact he never established to 
support his clai^ that the trial court should have 
lowered his conviction to a class A misdemeanor. 
Defendant contends he committed only a class A misdemeanor, 
and that the trial court should have reduced his conviction 
accordingly. However, defendant's argument relies entirely on a 
fact that he never established: that he stole, at most, $600.00. 
Defendant apparently derives this figure from his admission that 
he passed a total of six altered money orders, and from the 
$100.00 altered amount of the three money orders on which the 
State based its original charges. 
Nevertheless, the record does not support defendant's claim. 
Defendant never stated a total dollar amount for all of the money 
orders he passed, and nothing in the record establishes that he 
altered all of them to only $100.00. Moreover, defendant's claim 
that he passed only six lacks credibility: he admitted to six 
passed in Tremonton (R. 31,40), but the State knew of at least 
one he passed in Brigham City (R. 5, 77). 
On the other hand, defendant's plea necessarily admitted 
that he stole property worth enough to support it. At the time 
of the plea, he never contended that he stole a lower amount, and 
nothing in the record indicates that defendant did not know the 
9 
amount to which he pleaded.4 
The trial court correctly concluded that defendant's 
reliance on an unestablished fact distinguishes this case from 
the one on which defendant relied below; it also distinguishes 
this case from those on which he relies on appeal. All of those 
cases restrict trial courts to imposing the penalty prescribed at 
the time of sentencing out of deference to the legislature's 
prerogative to establish the level of punishment for any given 
set of facts. State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335-36 (Utah 1971); 
Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1971). However, in those 
cases, unlike this case, the established or undisputed facts 
supported only the lower penalty.5 In this case, the record does 
4In his brief, defendant suggests that his counsel did not 
know that the new theft classifications had taken effect at the 
time of his plea. Appellant's Brief at 4. The record does not 
support this suggestion. To the contrary, defense counsel stated 
at the motion hearing only that he did not know that the forgery 
reclassification had taken affect at the time defendant pleaded 
(R. 73-75); he never contended that he did not know the new theft 
classifications were already in effect. 
5In State Vt SaxtPH, 519 P.2d at 1340-41 and State v. Tapp, 
490 P.2d at 335, juries resolved any disputes in the facts 
supporting the elements of the charged crimes. In Belt v. 
Turner. 479 P.2d at 792, Belt pleaded guilty to issuing a 
fraudulent $10.00 check without sufficient funds (a charge that 
depended upon the amount of the check to determine the 
punishment), and nothing in the opinion suggests any dispute 
existed as to the amount for which Belt wrote the check. 
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not establish the $600,00 amount on which defendant relies; 
therefore, he has not established that the rule in Belt. Saxton. 
and Tapp applies to him. 
Defendant cannot rely on a fact he never established to 
obtain a reduced conviction and sentence, especially when he 
never disputed that the facts support his plea. 
B. Defendant's original second degree felony conviction is 
valid because it gave to defendant that for which he 
bargained. 
Defendant contends that he could not legally be convicted of 
a second degree felony because the State could never have proven 
sufficient facts to support a second degree felony theft. 
Therefore, according to defendant, the trial court should have 
reduced his conviction. 
Defendant incorrectly contends that the trial court could 
not legally sentence him for a crime that the State could not 
prove he actually committed. In Hurst v. Cook. 777 p.2d 1029 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that Hurst could 
not have committed the crime to which he pleaded. However, the 
supreme court refused to order a reduction of his sentence to 
that prescribed for the crime he claimed he could have committed 
because Hurst got what he bargained for in the plea negotiations. 
IlLu at 1038. 
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The same is true for defendant. Defendant's admissions and 
the State's information established that defendant passed a 
minimum of seven of the altered money orders in 1994(R. 1, 31, 
76). However, the State did not concede in the trial court and 
does not concede on appeal that defendant passed only seven. 
Defendant may have actually passed many more, and his agreement 
with the State precludes the State from prosecuting him for any 
of those passed in exchange for his plea to a second degree 
felony. 
Moreover, the record does not establish the amount of any 
but three of the money orders.6 Those as yet unrecovered, 
including the additional four established in the record, may have 
exposed him to multiple charges of up to second degree felony 
theft by deception. Only defendant knew the number and the 
amount of the money orders he actually passed. With that 
knowledge, he bargained for the State's agreement not to 
prosecute him for any of the money orders passed during 1994 in 
exchange for his plea to a single second degree felony theft by 
^Defendant altered the three money orders on which the State 
filed its original charges to $100.00. As noted above, defendant 
never stated the amount to which he altered the others. 
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deception.7 Because defendant got what he bargained for, he 
cannot seek a reduction in his conviction by contending that the 
State could not have proven the crime to which he pleaded. Id. 
C. Alternatively, defendant is entitled to a maximum 
reduction to a third degree felony-
Alternatively, defendant is at most entitled to a reduction 
to a third degree felony. At the hearing on his motion to 
withdraw the plea, the State acknowledged that it lacked 
sufficient information to prove the $5,000.00 necessary to 
support a second degree theft conviction under the 
reclassifications, then suggested the possibility of lowering 
defendant's sentence to a third degree felony (R. 78-79). 
As argued above, the State's inability to prove the second 
degree felony did not preclude defendant's plea to it, and 
consequently, did not preclude his second degree felony sentence. 
However, if this Court finds that the State's admissions, taken 
as a whole, suggest that the parties based their agreement on the 
old theft classifications, defendant's plea still amounts to an 
defendant has waived any claim that he based his plea on an 
inaccurate understanding of the charges the State may have 
brought against him. Although defendant originally sought to 
withdraw his plea, he ultimately withdrew that motion. On 
appeal, he has not claimed that counsel represented him 
ineffectively. Therefore, defendant has preserved no claim that 
his bargain was based on a misunderstanding of the law. 
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admission that he stole property worth at least $1,000.00. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995)(theft was punishable as a second 
degree felony if the property value was $1,000.00 or more). That 
admission supports a conviction for third degree felony theft 
under the new classifications. 
Therefore, even viewing the facts most favorably to 
defendant, he is entitled, at most, to a reduction to a third 
degree felony. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm 
defendant's guilty plea and sentence. Alternatively, the State 
asks the Court to limit any sentence reduction to a third degree 
felony. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The State requests oral argument to answer any questions or 
concerns the Court may have. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z4& day of sAfrri I , 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
^.c^^r^J^ 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this j^fMay of rTpry I 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
2568 Washington Blvd. #102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
JAcsvm A k\ • h)^n^f\ 2L 
15 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-6-405 CRIMINAL CODE 
Unauthorized control. 
An item need not be taken from a retailer's 
premises to constitute theft of the retailer's 
property; exercising unauthorized control over 
an item within a retail establishment is suffi-
cient to constitute the crime of theft. State v. 
Watte, 639 P.2d 158 (Utah 1981). 
The burden is on the state to prove unautho-
rized control, not on the defendant to prove 
authorized control; proof of lack of ownership 
alone does not establish unauthorized control. 
State v. Franks, 649 P.2d 3 (Utah 1982). 
A criminal prosecution of what is essentially 
a breach of a real estate sale agreement ex-
tends this section too broadly and therefore the 
conviction cannot stand. State v. Burton, 800 
P.2d 817 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
Although a partnership agreement granted 
the general partners numerous powers, it con-
tained the limitation that a general partner 
exercise those powers only in the best interests 
of the partnership; the defendant, a partner, 
was thus not authorized to deal with partner-
ship property in a manner that he knew was 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 2. 
C.J.S. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 1(3). 
AXJL — Larceny: entrapment or consent, 
10AJLR.3dll21. 
Criminal offenses in connection with rental 
of motor vehicles, 38 A.L.R.3d 949. 
Criminal prosecution based upon breaking 
into or taking money or goods from vending 
machine or other coin-operated machine, 45 
A.L.R.3d 1286. 
History: C. 1958, 76-6-405, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-6-405. 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Attempted theft. 
Distribution of imitation controlled substance. 
not in the partnership'6 best interests and he 
could be convicted of theft for exercising unau-
8 thorized control over partnership property. 
r State v. Larsen, 834 R2d 586 (Utah Ct. App. 
i- 1992). 
f
' Venue. 
Venue for an offense under this section is 
J[ properly laid in any county where an element of 
it occurred; the formation of a specific intent to 
P convert another's property within a county is 
la
 sufficient for venue to be proper there, notwith-
standing that the actual conversion took place 
y in another county. State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 
" (Utah 1977). 
e 
D Cited in State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400 
(Utah 1986); In re Jones, 720 P.2d 1356 (Utah 
i 1986); Stevens v. Sanpete County, 640 F. Supp. 
- S76 (D. Utah 1986); State v. Parkin, 742 R2d 
r 715 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jamison, 767 
B P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hunter, 
r, 831 R2d 1033 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
- Scott, 860 P.2d 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State 
s v. Laraen, 876 P.2d 391 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Changing of price tags by patron in self-
service store as criminal offense, 60 A~L.R.3d 
1293. 
Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses or 
allied criminal fraud by partner, 82 A.L.RSd 
822. 
Criminal liability for theft of, interference 
with, or unauthorized use of computer pro-
grams, files, or systems, 51 A.LJt4th 971. 
Elements of offense. 
—Reliance. 
— S e r i e s of misrepresentations. 
—Pecuniary loss. 
Evidence. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing* means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or group. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
200 
76-6-411 CRIMINAL CODE 
demand! by owner, court, aitting without a jury, viation" haa the common aenae meaning of 
waa not required to believe defendant'! teati- being an extreme deviation. State v. Owena, 
mony that he gave typewriter to hi! hnainee! 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1981). 
partner! to return, eince partner! were not 
called to corroborate his atorj, and defendant Use related to purpose of agreement* 
conveniently forgot important details. State v. Subsection (1) ff«wnM that the property 
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P.2d 780 (1966). may be used by the custodian for purposes 
Evidence supported conviction of embezzle- properly related to the purpose of the entrust-
ment, where defendant had been given permit- xotnt; only a use that constitutes "a gross 
aion to continue to use car on somewhat open] deviation from the agreed purpose," without 
ended contract after initial rental period had ^jpngg consent for personal use, is a crime, 
—V*3!** *ut defend*nt ailed to return car on
 g u t a v 3^^. 6 1 0 VM m h (UUih l 9 8 0 ) 4 
•pacific date on which he was finally told that 
he must return i t State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d Cited in State v. Owena, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah 
309, 489 R2d 107 (1971). Ct App. 1988). 
"Gross deviation." 
As used in this section, the term 'gross de-
COLLATERA1 REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny t 89. Key Numbers. — Larceny «» 15. 
O J A — 52A C J.S. Larceny J§ 46,47. 
76-6-411. Repealed* 
Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by tion of property subject to legal obligation, was 
L. 1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-411, relating to theft by repealed by Law! 1974, ch. 32, § 41. 
failure to make required payment or disposi-
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the properly or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2Xd) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys9 fees. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32,1 18; 
1975, ch, 48, a 1; 1977. ch. 89,1 1; 1989. ch* 
7M 1. 
Cross-References,—Bua Paaaenger Safety 
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, t 76-10-1508. 
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of 
livestock, ( 4-24-27. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Construction. 
Determining degree of crime. 
Evidence. 
Instructions. 
Lesser included offenses. 
Livestock. 
Prior convictions. 
Single offense baaed on separate takings. 
Valuation of stolen property. 
—Testimony of owner. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section, by making theft of certain live-
stock a third degree felony, irrespective of the 
value of the livestock, does not deny equal 
protection of the laws and doea not violate the 
constitutional prohibition against private or 
apecial laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1981). 
Construction* 
This section does not outline the elements of 
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for 
sentencing purposes into various degrees of 
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant 
was improperly charged under { 76-6-404 and 
this section with two separate counts of second 
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and 
property worth over $1000 in a aingle burglary; 
the crime was instead one theft offense under 
{ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree fel-
ony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 
975 (Utah Ct App. 1989). 
No claim for treble damages based on } 76-
6408(2 Xd) and this section against businesses 
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw 
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v. 
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993). 
Determining degree of crime. 
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is 
determined by the value of the property ob-
tained by defendant as a result of the deception 
without reducing that amount by any value 
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
Defendants second degree felony conviction, 
based on a check written for exactly $1,000, 
was plain error, since he could only have been 
convicted of a third degree felony on the basis of 
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 
(Utah 1985). 
Evidence. 
State's use of color photographs of the stolen 
property for evidence rather than producing 
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny 
defendant due process of law. State •. 
Ballenberger, 652 R2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
Instructions. 
It waa reversible error to omit to instruct as 
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto, 
left for repaira, but taken and driven away 
without satisfying lien existing on car; if jury 
had found that debt waa leas than $50, convic-
tion for grand larceny would have been error. 
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 PJM 626 
(1943). 
Leaser included offenses. 
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon is a leaaer included offense of second-
degree felony retail theft when the retail theft 
is made a felony by the actor's being armed 
with a deadly weapon in the course of the 
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct 
App. 1990). 
Livestock. 
Theft of dead calf was grand larceny, even 
though value of meat did not exceed $50, where 
animal was killed by thief as means of making 
theft possible. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,131 
P.2d 805il942). 
Prior convictions. 
A judgment of prior conviction must be writ-
ten, clear and definite, and signed by the court 
(or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as 
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this 
section. State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
Ct App. 1990). 
Single offense based on separate takings. 
Where defendant waa employed to solicit 
advertising contracts and within short time 
had collected from different persons $235 due 
publishing company upon contracts solicited 
and procured by him, and where he had unlaw-
fully converted money to his own use, taking of 
$235 was one embezzlement and constituted 
grand larceny, even though $48 was largest 
amount collected from any one individual. 
State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330,108 P. 349 (1910). 
The value of the property stolen in separate 
transactions can be added together to deter-
mine the degree of the crime if the separate 
transactions are part of one continuing plan 
and thus constitute a single offense. State v. 
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(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been 
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree 
felony, 
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are 
prescribed in Section 76-6-412. 
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or 
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable 
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section. 
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation, 
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use. 
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a 
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for 
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by 
this section. 
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy 
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company. 
History: C. 1953,1 70-6-409.3, enacted by prohibited acts* for "any of the following acts" in 
L. 1987, ch. 38, | 8; 1989, ch. 30,1 2; 1990, Subsection (2), rewrote Subsection (4Xa), 
ch. 130,1 1; 1995, ch* 291,1 12. changing the value ranges and the degrees of 
Amendment Notes* — The 1995 amend- offenses, and made a minor stylistic change; 
ment, effective May 1, 1995. substituted "any 
76-6-409.6. Use of telecommunication device to avoid law-
ful charge for service — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to 
avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service or with 
the knowledge that it was to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for 
telecommunication service is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service 
is less than $300 or cannot be ascertained; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service 
charge is or exceeds $300 but is not more than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is 
or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service 
is or exceeds $5,000. 
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this 
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and 
any subsequent conviction. 
History: C. 1953,76-6-409.6, enacted by L. than $300 or* is Subsection (lXa) and changed 
1994, ch. 215,1 3; 1995, ch. 291,1 13. the value ranges in Subsections (lXb) through 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- (dX 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted *is less 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
mnishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
^ v person who n»« ^ y P e J^*jd a x nage8, t f a I i y 
sag*** «»* 
-Writinr d e f t n e d 4 . ^ d anyone, o r * * 
(3) Forgery » f t i e 
76-6-501 CRIMINAL CODE 
Kimbel, 620 P.2d 515 (Utah 1980). 
Valuation of stolen property. 
Where auto owner took his car from posses-
sion of repairman by trick, or otherwise stole 
special property of bailee, value was amount of 
indebtedness; where thing stolen was written 
instrument evidencing debt, its value was de-
termined by amount remaining unpaid 
thereon. State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23,137 P.2d 
626 (1943). 
Stealing of purse which was 1 H feet from 
owner was not grand larceny in absence of proof 
of value. SUte v. Lucero, 28 Utah 2d 61, 498 
P.2d 350 (1972). 
For purposes of determining the degree of an 
offense graded in terms of the value of the 
property stolen, the proper measure is the 
current market value of the property at the 
time and place where the alleged offense was 
committed. State v. Logan, 663 P.2d 811 (Utah 
1977). 
Evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that more than $250 had been 
stolen from washers and dryers in a coin-
operated laundromat where laundromat owner, 
who had operated the business for twelve 
years, testified that roughly $600 to $800 was 
missing based upon estimates from money in 
the machines that were not disturbed and the 
total amount of money found in defendant's 
possession was nearly $600. State v. Whitten-
back, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980). 
The prima facie value of a stolen check is its 
face value whether the check is endorsed or not 
State v. Pacheco, 636 P.2d 489 (Utah 1981). 
Evidence held sufficient to establish at least 
$250 embezzled by theater manager. State v. 
Patterson, 700 R2d 1104 (Utah 1985). 
lb prove market value in a different city, the 
cities must be sufficiently close geographically 
and similar in population to be considered 
comparable for purposes of valuing the prop-
erty. SUte v. Carter, 707 PJ2d 656 (Utah 1985). 
—Testimony of owner. 
Owner is competent to testify to the value of 
stolen property where the owner's opinion of 
the value is based on comparable prices for 
similar property. State v. limb, 681 P.2d 142 
(Utah 1978). 
Owner of the stolen property was allowed to 
give his opinion as to the value of such property. 
SUte v. Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
Because an owner is presumed to be familiar 
with the value of his possessions, an owner i* 
competent to testify on the present market 
value of his property. SUU v. Purcell, 711 P.2d 
243 (Utah 1985). 
Owner's testimony that a stolen ring was 
worth $200 was inadmissible, because he had 
no independent knowledge or memory of its 
value nor was his memory refreshed after look-
ing at a police report SUU v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 
474 (Utah Ct App. 1991), cert denied, 843 R2d 
516 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in SUU v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 
1985); SUU v. Parkin, 742 P.2d 715 (Utah Ct 
App. 1987); SUU v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1987); SUU v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 
(Utah 1987); SUU v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); SUU v. Hunter, 831 R2d 
1033 (Utah Ct App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am.Jur.2d —50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 44. 
CJJ5. — 52A C.J3. Larceny ft 60(1). 
Key Numbers, — Larceny *• 23. 
PARTS 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing* defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
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numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
0) A* used in this section "writing* includes printing or any other method of 
recording information, checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, 
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
jfcntification. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second degree if the writing is or purports to be: 
(a) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
ty a government, or any agency thereof; or 
(b) a check with a face amount of $100 or more, an issue of stocks, 
bonds, or any other instrument or writing representing an interest in or 
daim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any 
person or enterprise. 
(4) Forgery is a felony of the third degree if the writing is or purports to be 
I check with a face amount of less than $100; all other forgery is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Ostory: C. 1953,76-6-601, enacted by L. 
Itn, eh. 196,1 76-6-501; 1974, ch. 82,1 19; 
HTSteh.52,1 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attempt 
Attareey signing client's name, 
aatbonty to use forged signature. 
Gssnficsuon of document 
•bitnity. 
-Postdated check. 
fisaeots of offense. 
- Hiking and passing. 
—Pissing 
~&Cnitura, 
Wince. 
—Hud writing. 
-Other crimes. 
—Sufficient 
Fife pretenses distinguished. 
rVntwus name. 
btament or information. 
httpt-
TUke* or "utter." 
fcesenption. 
Stpitura 
~ b general. 
^Authority to sign another's name. 
Standard of proof: 
Cuenng. 
fenance, 
*r*ct 
Qtai 
^sart information charging offense of forg-
•y osottined one count for forgery and another 
w ottering, attempt to utter could be shown. 
for it was immaterial that attempt to utter was 
unsuccessful; it was fact of uttering or attempt* 
ing to utter that was of evidentiary value. State 
v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 R2d 750 (1936). 
The crime of attempted forgery involves the 
same culpability and dishonesty as does the 
crime of forgery itaelfl State v. Rots, 782 P.2d 
629 (Utah CtApp. 1989). 
Attorney signing client's name* 
Section 78-51-32, which authorizes an attor-
ney to execute documents in the name of a 
client, does not authorize an attorney to forge a 
client's name to a negotiable instrument such 
as a settlement check and does not preclude the 
attorney's conviction for forgery as a matter of 
law when he does so; however, when an attor-
ney acts pursuant to the general authority 
granted by J 78-51-32 he may not later be 
convicted of forgery State v. Musselman, 667 
P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983). 
Authority to use forged signature. 
Where defendant forged his accomplice's 
name on checks which accomplice owned but 
had reported stolen, then cashed the checks 
and split the proceeds with the accomplice, 
defendant committed forgery as defined under 
Subsection (lXb), notwithstanding that the ac-
complice authorized defendant to sign his 
name. State v. Collins, 597 P.2d 1317 (Utah 
1979). 
Classification of document 
The trial court erred in conduding that a 
"receipt,* a document representing that a cus-
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(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another, 
,) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less 
than $5,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
:) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
eeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
i) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
in $300. 
ny person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6*408(1) 
ring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
ST, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
ry: C. 1963, 76-6-412, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
u 196,1 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, ( 18; ment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the 
u 48,1 1; 1977, ch. 89,1 1; 1989, ch. value amount* in Subjection* (IXaXi), (IXbXi), 
1995, ch. 291,1 14. (1XO, and (lXd). 
PARTS 
FRAUD 
501. Forgery — "Writing* defined. 
A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
edge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
ach altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
shes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, 
xecution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
airports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
lonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
lumbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
iriginal when no such original existed. 
As used in this section, "writing* includes: 
(a) printing or any other method of recording information, checks, 
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any 
>ther symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) printing or writing a security, revenue stamp, or any other instru-
ment or writing issued by a government or any agency, or 
(c) printing or writing a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
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History: C. 1953, 764-601, enacted by L. tion (2); deleted "with a face amount of $100 or 
1978, eh. 196,1 764-501; 1974, ch. 82, | 19; more" after "a check" in Subsection (2XO; de-
1975, ch-52,1 1; 1995, ch- 291, ( 15. leted If the writing if or purport* to be a check 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- with a face amount of leas than $100; all other 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, incorporated for- forgery if a claee A misdemeanor* from the end 
mer Subsection (3), which had set out the of Subsection (3>, and made minor stylistic 
elements of second degree forgery, into Subeec- changes throughout the section. 
76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment is refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with the drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draff8 nonpayment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows: 
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in 
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that 
is less than $300, the offense is a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the offense is a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state 
within a period not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or 
exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 70-6-505, enacted by L. ment, effective May 1, 1995, tocreaaed the 
1973, ch. 196,1 76-6-505; 1977, ch. 91, i 1; value amounts in Subsections (3Xa) through 
1983, ch. 92, | 1; 1995, ch. 291,1 16. (3Xd). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
76-6-506.1. Financial transaction card offenses — Falsely 
making, coding, or signing card — Falsely sign-
ing evidence of card transaction. 
Any person is guilty of a third degree felony who, with intent to defraud: 
(1) counterfeits, falsely makes, embosses, or encodes magnetically or 
electronically any financial transaction card; 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
vs. 
LARRY BRUCE DIETZ 
aka THOMAS LEONARD 
DEFENDANT. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 951000059 
HONORABLE BEN H. HADFIELD 
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Defendant's Motion For 
Resentencing. Prior to filing mis Motion, the Defendant had timely filed a Motion To 
Withdraw Plea. At a hearing on October 16,1995, with the Defendant personally present, 
the Defendant, through his attorney, directed mat the Motion To Withdraw Plea should itself 
be withdrawn. The Court advised the Defendant mat it was the Court's intention to grant the 
Motion To Withdraw Plea, but if the Defendant withdrew the Motion, the Court no longer 
had that option. After conferring with counsel, the Motion To Withdraw Plea was 
voluntarily withdrawn by the Defendant. 
MICIOFIIMED 
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The Defendant's guilty plea was a result of negotiations with the County Attorney. 
Relevant portions of the transcript of the hearing on May 15,1995 include the following: 
Mr. Bunderson: Actually, your Honor, Fve prepared an amended Information, if 
Mr. Dietz is prepared to enter a plea of guilty to it. I'd make a 
motion to file that. I sent a copy to counsel on May 5th. I 
have alleged a new single count of theft by deception, a Felony 
of the second degree. It combines all of the counts in Box 
Elder County during 1994. We're aware of three. I suspect 
there may be more. 
Mr. Snider: Part of the deal is that if any one else files additional 
complaints, he would have to pay full restitution, but this would 
resolve all of the checks arising from this period of time issued 
by Mr. Dietz. 
(Transcript Page 3, Lines 11 - 23) 
****************** 
Mr. Bunderson: Basically, what Mr. Dietz does is, as a method of being able to 
forge Money Orders, he buys $3.00 denomination Money 
Orders under phony names, and then forges the Money Order to 
make it $100 Money Order, and then purchases something. He 
did that at the three places alleged in the Information, all of 
which happened to be in Tremonton. We believe he did more 
than that, and he has admitted to doing, privately anyway, 
admitted to doing more than just those three places in Box Elder 
County during 1994, which would cause this to rise, if they are 
all lumped together, to the appropriate level for a second degree 
Felony. He was charged earlier with multiple second degree 
Felonies, but because of recent legislative changes, it is 
appropriate to lump them all together and make a single second 
degree. 
0 062 
Page 3 
The Court: Is that statement essentially correct as to what occurred, Mr. 
Dietz? 
Mr. Dietz: That's true, your Honor. 
The Court: Alright. The maximum penalties for a second degree are a term 
of 1 - 15 years in the Utah State Prison, and a fine of up to 
$10,000.00. Do you understand that, Mr. Dietz? 
Mr. Dietz: I understand that. 
(Transcript Page 8, lines 5 - 2 5 ; Page 9, lines 1 - 3 ) 
The Motion For Resentencing claims that prior to Defendant's entry of plea, the Utah 
State Legislature amended 76-6-412 which reclassified the current offense as a Class A 
Misdemeanor. Defendant has attached a copy of the opinion in State vs Gary R. Saxton 
519 P.2d 1340, (Utah 1974). In that case, the Supreme Court required the Defendant to be 
resentenced with the benefit of the lesser punishment imposed by the intervening statutory 
change. The Court finds significant differences between Saxton and the present case. In 
Saxton a Jury Trial was held, and the Defendant was convicted of a specifically charged 
crime based upon the evidence presented at trial. In the present case, the Defendant, through 
counsel, negotiated a comprehensive agreement whereby not only currently pending charges 
against the Defendant were dismissed, but also all potential forgery charges relating to Box 
Elder County for the year 1994 were precluded from being filed, in exchange for 
Defendant's guilty plea to a single, second degree Felony.. 
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After review of the file and die hearing transcript, this Court is of the opinion that the 
Defendant, who, at the time of sentencing was on federal probation, was an informed and 
educated Defendant, had adequate opportunity to confer with counsel, and made a 
comprehensive settlement of all pending and potential charges against him by entering a 
guilty plea to a single second degree Felony. The Court finds the opinion in State vs Saxton 
inapplicable to the present circumstances. The Defendant's Motion For Resentencing is 
denied. 
DATED this 3 l * d a y of October, 1995. 
